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This paper conceptualises the geosocial by examining the transnational connections of 
African student migrants and their educational experiences in Chinese cities. While 
there is now an established scholarship on Chinese migration to Africa, new research 
on the concurrent flow of African migration to China is emerging. Recent 
publications on African migrants in China tend to focus on the experiences of African 
traders, drawing out issues of illegality, ‘low-end’ globalisation and their impacts on 
Chinese trading cities. In comparison, this paper shifts the analytical lens to African 
educational migration in Chinese cities, foregrounding how global householding 
patterns reflect and leverage on the geopolitical and geo-economic dimensions of 
China-Africa relations. The paper shows that individual and family goals are 
negotiated through educational migration that, on the one hand, is concerned with 
accumulating human and cultural capital through a learning stint in Chinese cities, 
and on the other hand, is framed by perceptions of China-Africa relations. The paper 
argues that through educational migration, transnational social reproduction links 
Africa with China, but the social differentiation and everyday sociality that the 
African students experience in Chinese cities reinforce racial coding and development 
asymmetries. In so doing, the paper draws out how the geosocial reflects and 
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In an essay published in Geopolitics, Marcus Power and Giles Mohan1 persuasively 
argue that geo-economics, or how geopolitics is calibrated by market logics, ‘is 
crucial to any interpretation of contemporary China-Africa engagement and to our 
understanding of the spatial reconfiguration of contemporary political geographies 
that results from this engagement’. Scholars of China-Africa relations highlight 
similarly that China’s diplomatic engagement with African countries is led by its 
domestic economic agendas to do with energy or production needs and new consumer 
markets. 2  Such international relations and trade precipitate migration exchanges 
between Africa and China. However, the attention paid to the geo-economic and 
geopolitical aspects of capital, goods and people occludes the geo-social dimensions 
of transnationalism and development that are crucial in constituting the economic and 
political aspects of geo-strategic agendas. This paper examines the educational 
migration of African young adults to Chinese cities for educational purposes and 
argues that accompanying the globalisation of trade between China and Africa is the 
globalisation of households, or what Mike Douglass 3  refers to as ‘global 
householding’. Along with trade migration, spatially connecting China and Africa are 
the ‘worlding’ orientations4 that drive African households to undertake transnational 
education projects in which a young adult migrates to be schooled in universities at 
Chinese cities.  
 
The emerging literature on African migration to China mainly considers the 
experiences of African traders, drawing out issues of illegality and the impact of ‘low-
end’ globalisation on Chinese trading cities.5 This paper adopts a different approach 
to suggest that China is becoming an emerging educational destination for African 
students because of its growing geostrategic influence. Chinese cities, such as Beijing, 
Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai and Wuhan amongst others, function as key 
destinations for African students seeking higher educational opportunities in China. 
Prior to migration they perceived such cities as emblems of Chinese modernity and 
China as a model for African development. Yet day-to-day social encounters in those 
cities constitute new power geometries that impact their impression of China and 
perceptions of China-Africa relations. 
 
The paper situates this study in the literature on transnationalism and global 
householding and synthesises it with the scholarship on educational migration. This 
enables the paper to conceptualise the geo-social as evinced through the intertwining 
of transnational social reproduction with global trade and politics. The paper 
incorporates perspectives from feminist geopolitics to foreground the significance of 
everyday and embodied experiences that reflect racialisation processes contributing to 
global power asymmetries. Bringing together these sets of literature illuminates how 
studying the geo-social draws out the social relations that extend across space to 
sustain families, economies and national or global power. Through studying African 
student migration to China, the paper also demonstrate that analyses of the geo-social, 
understood as the constitution of subjects in transnational space, directs attention to 
the geopolitical significance of education and concomitant power geometries 
populating the transnational circulation of knowledge. 
 
To recap, the paper aims to first, examine how social reproduction through the 
transnational education of African students in China reflects and serves geo-strategic 
agendas. Second, the paper considers the everyday social relations that shape the 
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subjectivities of African students in China, highlighting, in particular, racialised 
encounters borne out of ‘coding habits from the past’. 6   The next section 
conceptualises the geosocial by signposting the significance of social reproduction, 
everyday social relations and educational subjectivities for geo-economic and 
geopolitical debates. Following the research methodology discussion, the paper shows 
how African educational migration to Chinese cities reflects global householding 
patterns and serves transnational social reproduction projects that are intertwined with 
geostrategic agendas. Next, the paper shows that despite such macro desires, the 
African students experience racial prejudice in the spaces of everyday life in Chinese 
cities. But they articulate their subjectivities in ways that creatively juxtapose 
‘Western’ and ‘Chinese’ modernity to destabilise the hegemony of both power 
structures. The conclusion reflects on the power geometries perceptible in 
transnational knowledge circulation brought forth through the international exchanges 
between China and Africa. 
 
The geosocial and global geographies of power 
The ‘geographies of power’,7 or global balance of power, is being recalibrated 
through the geostrategic agendas advanced by China in the Global South, including 
countries in the African continent. Much of the discussion referring to China’s ‘rise’ 
pays attention to its foreign aid, trade and investment priorities, energy needs and 
diplomatic activity in African states.8 Emma Mawdsley9 notes that such initiatives in 
Africa are not new. Tracing the shifts in Chinese policy, she argues that China sought 
to develop alliances with Africa when Mao Zedong promoted anti-imperialism 
ideologies (1949-1976), but the ideological dalliance shifted to economic pragmatism 
under Deng Xiaoping who prioritised the modernisation of China (1978-1989). 
Suisheng Zhao10 describes this as the ‘decade of neglect’ in China-Africa relations as 
the former shifted its foreign policy priority towards Western industrialised countries. 
But Chinese priorities changed again during the post-Tiananmen period (after 1989). 
China’s repression of domestic pro-democracy forces sparked reprisals from liberal 
democratic Western nations, which led it to seek political allies in authoritarian 
African countries. The contemporary period is characterised by deepening economic 
exchanges and diplomatic relations with a wide range of African countries. The 
dominant narrative of China-Africa relations is characterised by both geo-economic 
and geopolitical logic and activity. Aspects of social reproduction and everyday social 
relations that shape China-Africa interactions are generally relegated to the 
background despite being an integral part of the global geographies of power.11   
 
Commenting more than a decade ago on the parochial framing of the world cities 
literature which narrowly focuses attention on transnational capital circulation, Abdou 
Maliq Simone12 advocated paying attention to the ‘worlding’ of African cities instead, 
which he explains ‘involves the production of orientations to, and sensibilities about, 
the urban that seemed to posit that the salient features of urban life and its 
accomplishments were always also taking place somewhere else besides the 
particular city occupied’ (emphasis mine). Separately, Tim Bunnell and Peter 
Marolt13 urge researchers to consider the interface of places and flows, particularly 
the way the capacity to aspire (in their case for social mobilisation) is inspired or 
realised by not only localised conditions but also the routes through which 
international exchange and learning take place.14  
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Educational migration allows us to further conceptualise notions of worlding and 
routes, in this case connecting the urban aspirations of African youths to the Chinese 
cities where they migrate for educational purposes. The African student migrants in 
this paper are not the same as the ‘urban poor’ that Simone15 highlighted in his 
conceptualisation of ‘worlding’; rather the student migrants can be described as 
‘middling transnationals’16 who come from middle and upper-middle class families in 
African cities. But they similarly engage in ‘worlding’ practices of journeying abroad 
to realise personal goals and improve family life chances. As middling transnationals, 
their migration trajectories are mediated by both the emigration and immigration 
contexts as they navigate transnational journeys across the life course. 17 
Transnationalism scholarship also signals the fluidity of the ‘spatial and temporal 
imaginaries’18 contained within and shaping such migration circuits when migrants 
engage in circular or onward migration.   
 
Migrating for education is part of global householding strategies directed at 
optimising family welfare through transnational social reproduction,19 which Breda 
Gray20 explains as ‘biological and social activities and relationships that create and 
maintain people on a daily basis and inter-generationally such that the ongoing 
livelihoods of individuals, families and communities are ensured’. Debates on social 
reproduction are relevant to this paper in two ways. First, feminist scholars have long 
argued against the demarcation of production and reproduction (or work/non-work) as 
a false dichotomy that should be troubled.21 Second, in transnationalism scholarship 
Bourdieu’s definition of social reproduction has been invoked to analyse how class 
and status positions are regenerated in East Asian middle-class families through 
familial projects that entail sending their children for an overseas education in 
‘Western’ countries.22 The situation of the African students discussed in this paper 
usefully brings together both sets of literature and further draws attention to how 
China is emerging as an alternative study destination for international students.  
 
The African students move to China not only for acquiring Chinese educational 
credentials, but also to enhance the household’s economic prospects by leveraging on 
growing geopolitical and geo-economic ties between China and Africa. They seek to 
accumulate cultural capital derived from the Chinese urban experience that together 
with a Chinese university degree would make oneself stand out in the country of 
origin or if they develop careers in a third country.23 Such transnational education 
projects lend to the reproduction of social difference and class stratification.24 But a 
number of them are also sent by families back in Africa to oversee and participate in 
running family businesses that have a base in China to facilitate procurement and 
trading activities. In other words, the student identity is not the only one that 
international students like them embody.25 
 
The decision of a growing number of African students to embark on an overseas 
education in China is revealing of changing tailwinds partially decentring the 
hegemony of Western educational institutions as sites of modern education. The study 
destinations of international students are influenced by their perception of the 
geostrategic influence of a country. Destination countries also provide scholarships 
for international students so as to advance bilateral awareness. Educational 
institutions reflect the national image that a country wishes to project through 
branding that serves ideological and socialisation purposes.26 Yet the experiences of 
students in educational institutions and their social interactions with the host society 
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may counter the projected national image of the study destination. The lives of the 
African students in Chinese cities entail quotidian interactions with Mainland Chinese 
students, traders and wider society in urban spaces such as hostels, schools, work 
places and recreation sites. The nature of such everyday sociality is easy to overlook. 
But it reveals ‘the daily practices sustaining larger places, structures and processes’, 
and further ‘draws attention to the ubiquity of the entanglements between various 
realms of life’.27 This includes how the geosocial is intertwined with the geo-
economic and geopolitical aspects of transnationalism and development agendas.  
 
Feminist geopolitics has also flagged up the significance of the everyday and 
embodied realms of life that contribute to the discursive and material relations 
through which global political processes are reproduced or challenged across sites and 
different scales of analyses.28 Seemingly non-geopolitical concerns expressed in the 
spaces of everyday life are integral to the operations of global power too.  Studying 
student migrants draws attention to educational institutions as mundane sites where 
people make meaning of the different global contexts in which they operate, including 
processes of racialisation that contribute to the way young people negotiate 
geopolitical change.29  
 
In turn the mobility of students contributes to the circulation of knowledge that is 
always ‘embedded within complex power dynamics at a variety of spatial scales’.30 
Such circulation of knowledge can be found in the everyday interactions of African 
students as they engage one another, their Chinese peers, teachers and other members 
of society; through these social interactions a lineage of racism and contemporary 
racialisation emerges to constitute not only their student identities but also their 
perceptions of the global political context in which they are embedded. Madge et al.31 
urge for a postcolonial analysis of educational migration since it is ‘a site where 
legacies of colonialism and the contemporary processes of globalisation intersect’.32 
Their critique is rooted in the inequalities of Eurocentrism, while the case of African 
educational migration in China discussed here draws out transversal power dynamics 
that define the global geographies of power today.   
 
Methodology 
Chinese cities such as Guangzhou and Wuhan, where this study was conducted, 
appeal to African students because of the urban experiences they offer. Guangzhou, in 
coastal China, is the capital of Guangdong province with a population of 14 million 
people. International and internal migrants flock to Guangzhou for trading and 
educational opportunities. Wuhan is located in inland China and the capital city of 
Hebei province; its population stands at 10 million people. Compared to metropolitan 
Guangzhou, the city of Wuhan might be considered provincial but it serves as an 
educational hub for several prestigious universities (particularly the science and 
technology sector). Wuhan is fast internationalising as it develops urban amenities 
such as international shopping districts and cafes targeting the consumption power of 
Chinese and foreign students and professionals. To African students both cities 
present a concentration of prior social ties, as African business contacts or family 
members and friends are likely to have studied in the universities found in these two 
cities. 
 
My fieldwork was conducted from 2012-2015. In the study I recruited 42 students 
through the snowballing technique across two field sites. Initial contact was made 
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through the personal networks of Chinese students and also by getting in touch with 
the international student society. The study carried out 78 formal and informal 
interviews in total (including repeat interviews). Two-thirds of the respondents were 
male and one third female. The study sample was not delimited by nationality, so as 
to capture the diversity of African students represented in China.33 While I recognise 
the contested aspects of the label, ‘African’, the paper uses this referent to 
contextualise international student migration in geopolitical and geo-economic 
discourses of ‘China-Africa’ relations. The interviews signal that inasmuch as the 
students identify as nationals of a country they also negotiate a wider African identity 
through their migration experiences in China. On one level, this is in response to 
essentialising racialised stereotypes that are projected onto them by the Chinese who 
refer to them as ‘black people’ (heiren), which they reframe as ‘African’ instead. On 
another level, it is also an expression of how their migration and identities have been 
shaped in the wider context of China’s actual or perceived growing presence across 
the African continent. 
 
Less than one-quarter of the African students who participated in the study are 
scholarship students and the majority are self-funded. At the time of research, the 
respondents were enrolled in undergraduate or postgraduate programs in Chinese 
universities, and have lived in China for at least a year. The areas of specialisation 
popular amongst African students are in international business and economics, 
politics and law, computer science, engineering and medicine. Usually the students 
arrive a year prior to the start of their degree program so as to attend basic Chinese 
language classes first. Some courses that have large foreign student enrolment, such 
as business degrees, deliver classes in English.  
 
The interviews were conducted in English or Mandarin depending on whether the 
African student interviewed is Anglophone or Francophone. Francophone students 
who lived in China for several years have usually learned to speak Mandarin fluently. 
A handful of Francophone respondents felt less confident carrying out an interview 
fully in Mandarin and in such cases they would bring along a trusted friend to help 
translate parts of the conversation into English or Mandarin. Apart from the 
interviews, ethnographic observations contributed to the analyses in this paper. I spent 
time with the African students as they carried out their daily lives in schools, hostels, 
workplaces and student leisure spaces, which helped contextualise their interview 
narratives and deepen understanding of their experiences studying and living in 
Chinese cities.  
 
African educational pursuits as ‘worlding’ and global householding 
The worlding orientations of African students drive them to pursue international 
educational opportunities. Although the academic literature tends to focus on African 
students who migrate to Western countries for higher education,34 anecdotal evidence 
suggests that a parallel flow has opted for the Middle East, other African countries 
(e.g. South Africa), and socialist regimes such as China and Cuba.35 The choice of 
study destination has to do with bilateral relations, religious affinity, affordability, or 
prior social ties in the destination country. The migration of African students to China 
is not new, but their numbers are surging compared to the past. This section argues 
that their transnational education journeys are entangled with the political economy of 
trade and international relations.  
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Why do African students choose China and how are their transnational educational 
journeys intertwined with the international political economy? Compared to Western 
universities, it is less expensive to study in China (tuition fees and living expenses can 
cost as little as US$8000 per annum in lower tier Chinese cities) and the students said 
that they are more likely to succeed in applying for a visa to study in China than if 
they applied to study in Europe or North America. For African students, postcolonial 
ties with the United Kingdom or France means studying in these countries would have 
provided greater familiarity because the language and educational systems are similar 
to their countries of origin. But the students interviewed believe that it is difficult for 
African students to successfully apply for study visas in those countries whereas the 
Chinese government encourages China-Africa educational links and has disbursed 
more than 18 000 scholarships to African students as of 2013.  
 
Scholarships offered by the Chinese government to African students can be traced 
back to the 1950s, when China sought to secure alliances with African countries 
against Western imperialism. Rhetoric of past and present solidarity regularly 
characterise the speeches of Chinese officials to African audiences. As Zhao36 notes, 
‘education is regarded as a “long term investment to win the hearts and minds of 
Africa’s future leaders’. 37  Opportunities to study in China are paved through 
sponsorship offers for the select few chosen by their home governments or 
universities that administer the Chinese scholarships. More often it is family fortunes 
that facilitate a Chinese educational stint. Since only wealthy class families can afford 
to send their children for studies in China,38  overseas exposure to educational 
opportunities might be considered a private good.  
 
Many of the African students have family members that run businesses importing 
Chinese goods to Africa (e.g. textiles, fashion accessories, electronics and other 
consumer goods). Their educational goals include learning the Chinese language in 
order to facilitate family businesses. Guangzhou is a popular choice amongst such 
families. For those studying in Guangzhou, the ability to remain in China on a student 
visa enables them to help their family members keep an eye on the functioning of the 
family business. A student from Ivory Coast explained that his father encouraged him 
to go to China for this reason: 
My father was like, ‘Wow, you know what? China is growing so fast... if you 
go to China, it will benefit not only my business, but also you… Because 
language is a barrier [for us], go there and study Chinese’. 
 
Juggling classes and homework with business activity is demanding on the African 
students. Occasionally students may notify lecturers that they have to arrive late or 
leave in the middle of class because of a business transaction. An undergraduate from 
Tanzania rationalised the overlap between her business and student life by explaining, 
‘without doing business we may not be able to pay our tuition fees’. Several 
expressed feeling under family pressure to succeed in their studies alongside business 
activities. Another undergraduate from Tanzania said that relatives and friends grill 
her about her education and business activities when she returns home during the 
summer vacation, while her father is watchful over how she spends her time in China 
because he wants her to acquire business skills for personal growth and to improve 
the social status of the family through her educational stint abroad.  
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The migration trajectories of African students are shaped by family priorities that lead 
to global householding patterns where one or more children remain in China while the 
parent returns to Africa and travels regularly to ensure the smooth operation of the 
business in China and possibly elsewhere in the world. Alongside the family business, 
the African students may extend their translation and transaction services to extended 
family members or friendship networks back in Africa.  
 
For students studying in Wuhan, which in further from the thriving trading hubs of 
Guangzhou and Yiwu (in Zhejiang province), daily participation in business activities 
is constrained by physical distance. But during the study break, they travel to trading 
cities and stay to work temporarily as translators or trading intermediaries. To them, it 
presents an opportunity to gain working experience, build professional contacts, and 
earn extra income. One of the students from Egypt had studied Mandarin in Beijing 
before moving to Wuhan to enrol in a postgraduate degree. He said that during the 
summer holidays he goes to Guangzhou to work as a translator in a trading firm run 
by his gemen’er (or ‘brother’ which in Mandarin refers to a good friend). He 
explained:  
There are many opportunities for Arabic translators like me to dagong (work) in 
Guangzhou and it is more pleasant to spend summer there than in Wuhan [where the 
temperature in summer is higher]’.  
 
Although the interview was conducted in English, the respondent peppered his 
answers with Chinese colloquialisms like ‘dagong’ and ‘gemen’er’ to signal his 
familiarity with the Chinese language and culture. The way he negotiates his studies 
and work life highlights the entanglement of social reproduction and production 
evinced in African student migration to China as the students integrate education and 
trade-related activities. As capitalist production, distribution and consumption 
globalises, so has education as social reproduction. 
 
For the African students based in Wuhan, the city’s location and industrial base (even 
though the service sector is gaining importance) restricts their trading activities to the 
vacation period, but the students there mentioned that not being in Guangzhou enables 
them to focus on their studies. An undergraduate from Burkina Faso who is studying 
in Wuhan reflected, ‘some of my friends went to Guangzhou but they did not graduate 
because they became distracted with doing business’. Despite being less 
internationally prominent than Guangzhou, Wuhan still offers African students the 
opportunity to realise their educational goals and experience Chinese urbanism, which 
they aspire for African urban development (e.g. emblems of modernisation such as 
skyscrapers, transport infrastructure, international shopping malls and urban 
amenities).  
 
Nonetheless, they express that African cities should adopt selective aspects of 
Chinese urbanism only. Compared to the African cities in which they have lived, the 
student migrants opined that Chinese urban inhabitants embody poorer hygiene habits 
and are less convivial, especially towards foreigners like them. For example, a female 
undergraduate from Zimbabwe complained: 
I don’t like the fact that Chinese people spit everywhere on the floor… Everywhere, 
even like food markets, shopping malls, everywhere they just spit on the ground. It is 
shocking to see that.  
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Her friend from Congo-Brazaville added, ‘[the Chinese] are shocked to see foreign 
and black people… they take pictures without asking [and] it is rude.’ Unpleasant 
encounters in Chinese cities lead such African students to chart alternative urban 
aspirations for the cities and countries they come from, which this paper discusses in 
the next section. Whether it is Guangzhou or Wuhan, Chinese cities provide a means 
for African student migrants to realise their urban aspirations by being part of the 
spectacular urban growth of China, which they had only read or heard about 
previously, and accrue the higher educational qualifications that will enable them to 
contribute to the development of their home countries. Alongside this, they engage in 
trading related activities through their stay in Chinese cities to supplement personal 
and family incomes.  
 
The growth of China-Africa trading relationships has simultaneously raised the 
reputation of the Chinese political and economic system, which ranks favourably in 
the eyes of the African students and their parents. China represents to them an 
economic giant that is outstripping the growth rate of Western economies. Learning 
the Chinese language and mastering social-cultural interactions through a stint in 
China is considered advantageous to job prospects in African countries, such as 
working for companies doing business with Chinese partners, in the diplomatic sector 
or government positions, and even at international agencies like the United Nations or 
World Bank. Current studies of international students have highlighted the cultural 
and potential economic value of learning the English language to explain why 
destinations countries such as the UK, US, Australia and New Zealand are popular 
with international students.39 Given the colonial histories of African countries, the 
African students in China are often already competent in English or French, so 
Mandarin functions as a third language to give them additional advantage in the light 
of China’s growing geopolitical and geo-economic presence in African countries and 
internationally. A postgraduate from Mauritius told me that since he speaks French 
and English fluently, he decided to learn Mandarin in China so that with the 
additional language competency he would be considered better qualified to apply for 
jobs at the United Nations eventually.  
 
Laurie et al.40 argue that obtaining professional status forms the basis of individual 
social ambitions and influences family and generational economic strategies. They 
add that education is also linked to particular visions of development and 
modernisation, described as the ‘whitening effect’ of racist nation building and 
development agendas. For the African students studying in China, the Sino-centric 
approach towards modernisation offers an alternative model of development to 
Westernisation. They desire to learn more about how China succeeded internationally, 
and this type of learning cannot be captured if they remain in African universities or 
go to another part of the world. However, as the next section discusses, their 
educational experiences in China and everyday social lives in Chinese cities reflect 
and reinforce asymmetrical relations in the global balance of power. 
 
De/re-centring the global geographies of power? 
The stretching of social reproduction through educational pursuits in China presents a 
twist to the existing literature on educational migration to Western countries.41 
Countering conventional perceptions that foreign students in China register mainly in 
short-term language learning or cultural immersion schemes, the number of foreign 
students enrolling for longer-term Chinese degree programs is growing but there is a 
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paucity of research critically reflecting on their motivations and experiences. 
Acquiring a Chinese degree qualification means social advancement and cultural 
prestige for nationals from less economically well-off countries. The African student 
migrants interviewed express quiet confidence that the ability to speak Mandarin and 
brandishing a Chinese degree certificate will improve their employment prospects, 
such as in government or with companies doing Africa-China investment and trade, 
and even create entrepreneurial opportunities. Several believe that Chinese 
educational degrees can facilitate their pathways to postgraduate degrees or 
professional employment in Australia, New Zealand, UK, Canada, US or European 
countries. The ‘worlding’ trajectory that led them to develop their urban aspirations in 
Chinese cities gives rise to follow-on routes to pursue their ambitions in another city 
at a third country ‘somewhere else’. However, immigration research has shown that 
Mainland Chinese graduates and professionals face difficulty qualifying for 
professional employment in those same countries because of language or systematic 
barriers in the labour market arising out of racism and the devaluation of Chinese 
university degrees.42  
 
How does an educational experience in China constitute the subjectivities of these 
African students, and in what ways does this allow us to conceptualise the geosocial? 
Even though the African students I met in China belong to a relatively privileged 
socio-economic spectrum of the African countries they left, they believe they have to 
go somewhere else in the world in order to advance their life prospects. The African 
student migrants interviewed also expressed that their learning experiences in Chinese 
universities have not encouraged the critical or creative learning they desire. One of 
the African students who is studying for an engineering degree shared his experience 
of classroom learning: 
 
The Chinese students do not ask questions… When I asked a question the first time, the 
lecturer responded. When I asked another time, he ignored me. Later he pulled me 
aside and said ‘if you have a question, ask me after class’. But to me, maybe the other 
students don’t understand too! I don’t ask questions now. In my country, the lecturer 
draws from a variety of sources and not a textbook, and we can experiment during 
practicals. Here my Chinese teacher says, ‘you cannot do this, you cannot touch that’. 
When the Chinese universities advertise in my country, it sounds like they have great 
facilities and teaching, but now I know it is a shell. 
 
Of the African student migrants who expressed such sentiments strongly, several had 
completed diploma or tertiary training in their home institutions or abroad (e.g. South 
Africa, France or the UK) before going to China. They compared their educational 
environment in Chinese universities with prior experiences of studying elsewhere, and 
felt the substance of the Chinese educational experience did not live up to the 
international branding projected by those institutions abroad. 
 
Outside of the classroom where informal learning takes place, the African student 
migrants interviewed want to develop their Chinese language skills and cultural 
competencies as part of the skills set they hope to acquire from their time in China. 
They felt it would be useful to engage in social interactions with the Chinese students 
and society. But they signalled the barriers they encountered on campus because 
hostel arrangements separate foreign students from local Chinese students. The 
African student migrants inform me that university administrators justify the 
separation of foreign students from Chinese students by saying that foreign student 
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hostels are equipped with better living facilities. For example, fewer foreign students 
share a room, and in one university hostel that I visited, the single rooms contained 
en-suite toilets. Conversations with local Chinese students suggest these conditions 
are far better than their hostels. But unofficially, the foreign students understand that 
university administrators are concerned about the ‘moral degradation’ of Chinese 
students if they shared living spaces with foreign students.  
 
In contemporary China, there remains racial prejudice found in university spaces that 
parallel the tensions in social relations directed at African students during the post-
Mao era, which culminated in violent demonstrations on university campuses during 
1988-1989.43 The ‘remainders of race’, or what Amin44 explains as ‘coding habits 
from the past [that are] deeply etched into institutional and social consciousness’, 
continue to materialise spatially through segregated living and socialising spaces for 
Africans in Chinese cities. Some African student migrants observe that their Chinese 
classmates are not interested to socialise with them or those who do mainly want to 
use the opportunity to improve their personal English language skills. As a respondent 
from Burkina Faso puts it:  
If you call your Chinese friends to go out, they tell you, ‘Oh, I don't have time’ or ‘I 
have to do something’. Or if you call your Chinese friend today, they might say, ‘we 
will meet tomorrow’. Tomorrow your friend tells you, ‘Oh, I have some problems’. It’s 
always like this… Most of the Chinese students who come out with you just want to 
speak English, not Chinese. If you want to speak Chinese, the Chinese people don’t 
want to speak [with you]. They want to speak English with you’.  
 
Other African student migrants suggest that the Chinese have different leisure 
preferences that deter social mixing. To them, African students socialise over drinks 
or in clubs,45 whereas the Chinese students prefer to socialise over Chinese meals or 
in karaoke bars where they croon Chinese language songs that are unfamiliar to their 
African peers. Initially both parties try to engage one another but the frequency of 
interactions reduce as cultural habits set in.  
 
The Chinese students come from a range of socio-economic backgrounds too. Some 
are rural migrants and many are not as wealthy as the African students who have 
higher consumption power due to family support or the side income they earn from 
business activity. The African students saw themselves as more urbane or modern 
than their Chinese counterparts. This is reflected in food or fashion preferences. When 
I asked African female students about their leisure activities they often say they would 
shop in places different from the Chinese students or buy their clothes online. Probing 
further, they explained to me that it boils down to fashion sense. As a female 
undergraduate from Zimbabwe studying in Wuhan puts it: ‘If you go outside for 
shopping, mostly they are Chinese clothes, but if you want to buy something good [to 
wear], maybe online [because] you can find European shops’. On a separate occasion, 
she elaborated, ‘we dress differently from the Chinese students. We like international 
brands such as those at Hanjie (a pedestrian mall lined with boutique shops). We 
don’t buy clothes that the Chinese girls like… [points to a passer-by wearing a dress 
with delicate lace and embroidery]’.  
 
Another student from Tanzania studying in Guangzhou suggested that African 
students prefer ‘Western’ food to Chinese food. Granted, the above are 
generalisations made of cultural tastes in both contexts. But the key point is 
seemingly mundane choices over food, fashion and socialising habits flag the 
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differences found in everyday sociality, while allowing the African student migrants 
to assert alternative views of modernity and urbanity.  They refuse to be drawn fully 
into Chinese framings of these cultural categorisations. Yet, one might also argue that 
the African students negotiate a social-cultural space where they are reinforcing forms 
of ‘Western’ modernity even as they seek an educational experience in China to 
correct the developmental asymmetries forged by Western hegemony in the first place.  
 
Most of the African interviewees desire to remain after graduation and work in 
Chinese cities such as Beijing or Shanghai. They hope to be employed professionally 
in their field of expertise, defying the ‘traders’ identity attached to African migrants 
who come to China. But visa restrictions in China limit their opportunities to gain 
working experience in their areas of specialisation or remain in the country for the 
longer term. Transiency characterising the African presence in China is a recurring 
theme in the literature on African migrants in China.46 The African students are 
pessimistic about their employment prospects in Chinese companies. As a male 
respondent from Ivory Coast puts it, ‘there are many unemployed Chinese people in 
China so why would Chinese employers hire a foreigner like us?’ Limited post-
graduation options in China means they are likely to take up jobs related to trading if 
they opt to remain in China. A female student from Burkina Faso said that she came 
to China because she thought that China’s growing geostrategic clout means:  
The Chinese language will be like English, [an] international language. If you speak the 
Chinese language [and] English, it will be better […] than people who don't know how 
to speak Chinese. 
 
But the daily realities of racial prejudice in Chinese cities eroded her optimism and 
she says: ‘the Chinese people look at [Africans] like an animal… [Taxi drivers] don’t 
want to take you because you are African’. After completing her studies in China she 
plans to re-migrate to Canada, a country that she considers more welcoming both for 
its immigration regulations and attitudes towards cultural diversity. Research on 
young people’s emotional negotiation of geopolitical events argues that what happens 
at the global political scale has material impacts on their everyday lives too47. In the 
case of the African youths, the wider geopolitical context of China-Africa relations 
had influenced their decisions to pursue a Chinese degree, but material experiences of 
racialisation in Chinese cities and employment barriers prompt onward migration 
intentions.  
 
On hindsight or learning from the experiences of other Africans they meet in China, 
the African students feel simultaneously hopeful yet regretful about their decisions to 
study in Chinese universities. They anticipate the paper qualifications from China will 
put them in good stead if they return to Africa or move to other countries. Yet those 
who have been in China for several years express that they could have learned more 
professionally and socially if they had gone to study in a ‘Western’ institution. 
Belatedly, their experiences of studying in China and life in Chinese cities give rise to 
follow-on aspirations to be realised through onward migration to another city 
elsewhere in the world. 
 
The above discussion signals how perceptions of the geopolitical clout and geo-
economic reach of China influences the migration decisions of African students who 
go to Chinese cities for an educational stint. Their transnational journeys are part of 
global householding patterns to optimise transnational social reproduction and 
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production opportunities for themselves and the family. However, systemic structural 
barriers and their everyday encounters in Chinese cities are saturated with racial 
prejudices that entrench cultural domination through past colonial and new neo-
colonial structures of power. The way such discourses are articulated and performed 
in educational institutions, the workplace and the everyday urban spaces of Chinese 
cities helps us make sense of how these discourses contribute to subjectification.48 
This, in turn, shapes the urban aspirations of the African students in China as well as 
China-Africa relations in the wider context of the global geographies of power.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper shows how educational migration is motivated and accelerated by the 
spread, frequency and density of geo-economic and geopolitical relationships tying 
China with African countries. But equally, educational migration shapes the 
reproduction of such relationships too. As evinced from the narratives of the African 
students, their experiences in Chinese cities and China translate into urban aspirations 
for how they would like African cities and their countries to develop. Pursuing an 
overseas education in China is framed by the African students as arising out of a 
desire to correct development asymmetries and access to political space. Several of 
the African students interviewed expressed that only by mastering the conduct of 
Chinese business and politics can African countries negotiate effectively with China. 
Education serves not only the purpose of social reproduction but is also tied to 
political subjectivities and economic ambitions. Yet their experiences of living in 
Chinese cities and studying in Chinese universities only reproduce racist geographies 
and development asymmetries. 
 
The knowledge circulation represented by the mobility of African students and the 
situatedness of their learning in China are experienced through precognitive racial 
classification and development hierarchies that place them as abject inhabitants of 
Chinese urban space.49 They share their racialized experiences of studying in Chinese 
universities, comparing the pros and cons by setting it into the context of their earlier 
education in African institutions, many of which have been shaped by ‘Western’ 
colonialism and globalisation. Nonetheless, they also undermine the development 
asymmetries that characterise their everyday sociality in China by asserting 
alternative views of modernity and urbanity, comparing their knowledge of Chinese 
society with what they know of ‘Western’ culture through colonial legacies and 
globalisation. These African students are discerning subjects of the higher education 
they receive in China, how it is constituted through the global geographies of power 
and its implications for China-Africa relations. Madge et al.50 remind us that ‘the to-
ing and fro-ing of knowledge from mobile students […] continues to form, a 
contribution in shifting boundaries of what constitutes contemporary geographical 
knowledge… But these circulations are not neutral processes [since] the global terrain 
is uneven and the contributions of knowledge agents are not valued equally’. 
 
Even as growing China-Africa relations seem to signal shifts in the global 
geographies of power to counterbalance ‘Western’ framings of modernisation and 
development, we need to recognise as well that China is complicit in producing its 
own circuits of hegemonic knowledge through institutional setups at home and abroad. 
Knowledge transfer from China to Africa takes place through higher educational 
institutions, medical centres, business practices, diplomacy and more. Chinese 
interactions with these countries entail the categorisations of ‘race’ and ethnicity, 
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cultural imaginations of ‘self’ and ‘other’, or hegemony and power. As China’s global 
influence expands, more countries in the Global South and Global North will be roped 
into national portrayals of ‘Chinese models’ of development and their attendant 
knowledge circuits.51 Bringing the geosocial to the fore troubles the hegemonic bases 
of knowledge by sensitising us to the particularities of the social spaces in which 
knowledge is produced and practiced, their interconnections across global space, and 
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